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1.	  
In	   his	   paper	   ‘The	   Tractatus	   on	   Unity’,	   José	   Zalabardo	   argues	   that	   the	   Tractatus	   makes	  
important	   contributions	   towards	   the	   resolution	   of	   two	   related	   problems,	   the	   problem	   of	  
semantic	  unity,	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  metaphysical	  unity.	  The	  problem	  of	  metaphysical	  unity	  
consists	  in	  explaining	  how	  the	  unity	  of	  a	  fact	  arises	  out	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  its	  constituent	  
objects.	   The	   problem	   of	   semantic	   unity	   consists	   in	   explaining	   how	   a	   propositional	  
representation	  doesn’t	  merely	   introduce	  various	  objects	  but	   furthermore	  represents	   them	  
as	  combined	   in	  a	  certain	  way.	  According	   to	  Zalabardo,	  Wittgenstein	   takes	  rather	  different	  
attitudes	   to	   these	   two	   problems.	   The	   semantic	   problem	   is	   solved	   by	   the	   idea,	   central	   to	  
Wittgenstein’s	  picture	   theory,	   that	   a	   representation	   is	   a	   fact	  which	   exemplifies	   in	   its	   own	  
combinatorial	   mode	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   represents	   its	   objects	   as	   combined.	   The	  
metaphysical	  problem,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  rejected	  as	  relying	  on	  a	  mistaken	  conception	  of	  facts	  
as	   compounds.	   In	   this	   response,	   I	   take	   individual	   issue	  with	  both	  attributions,	   and	  briefly	  
query	  also	  their	  coherence.	  	  
2.	  
“The	   semantic	   problem	   of	   unity,”	   Zalabardo	   writes,	   “arises	   for	   a	   [certain]	   strategy	   for	  
explaining	  our	  faculty	  of	  propositional	  representation”	  (3).	  According	  to	  this	  strategy:	  
language	  and	  the	  mind	  make	  contact	  with	  the	  world	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
the	  items	  from	  whose	  combination	  facts	  are	  produced.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  a	  mental	  or	  
linguistic	  item	  that	  represents	  Pavarotti	  as	  singing	  is	  connected	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  to	  
the	   individual	   Pavarotti	   and	   the	   property	   of	   Singing.	   Then	   the	   representational	   item	  
will	   represent	   the	   world	   as	   containing	   a	   fact	   produced	   by	   the	   combination	   of	   the	  
individual	   Pavarotti	   and	   the	   property	   of	   Singing.	   …	   The	   [semantic	   problem	   of	   unity]	  
arises	   from	   the	   reflection	   that	   singling	   out	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   property	   is	   not	  
enough	   for	   representing	   things	  as	  being	  a	  certain	  way—for	  representing	  Pavarotti	  as	  
singing.	   …	   The	   problem	   consists	   in	   explaining	   what	   else	   will	   be	   required	   for	  
representing	  things	  as	  being	  a	  certain	  way	  in	  mind	  or	  language,	  besides	  singling	  out	  the	  
items.	  (3)	  
A	  representation	  doesn’t	  merely	  single	  out	  various	  things:	  it	  furthermore	  represents	  those	  
things	   as	   combined	   in	   a	   certain	   way.	   But	   how?	   Well,	   Wittgenstein’s	   basic	   proposal,	  
Zalabardo	   maintains,	   is	   that	   the	   representation	   is	   not	   a	   mere	   collection	   of	   names	  
introducing	   a	   collection	   of	   objects,	   but	   a	   fact	   which	   exemplifies	   in	   its	   own	   mode	   of	  
combination	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  objects	  are	  represented	  as	  combined.	  “By	  using	  a	  fact	  to	  
represent	   things	   as	   being	   a	   certain	   way,”	   Zalabardo	   writes,	   “we	   bring	   a	   mode	   of	  
combination	  into	  the	  representational	  episode”	  (7).	  And	  this	  mode	  is	  precisely	  that	  in	  which	  
the	  objects	   are	   represented	   as	   combined:	   “we	   represent	   things	   in	   the	  world	   as	   combined	  
with	   one	   another	   in	   the	   same	   way	   in	   which	   the	   constituents	   of	   the	   depicting	   fact	   are	  
combined	  with	  one	  another.”	  (7)	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   This	  matter	  of	   semantic	  unity	   is	   sometimes	  cast	  by	  Zalabardo	  as	  a	  question	  not	  of	  
how	  we	   represent,	   or	   of	   how	  a	   representation	   represents,	   but	   of	   how	  a	   representation	   is	  
understood.	   In	   this	   guise,	   the	   problem	  becomes	   that	   of	   “explaining	   how,	   in	   an	   episode	   of	  
understanding,	   the	  subject	   is	  aware	   [not	  merely	  of	  various	  objects	  but	  also]	  of	   the	  way	   in	  
which	   [those	   objects]	   are	   represented	  by	   the	  proposition	   as	   combined	  with	   one	   another”	  
(5).	  Here	   the	   proposed	   solution	   is	   that	   in	   understanding	   a	   proposition	  we	   do	   not	  merely	  
bring	  to	  mind	  the	  items	  referred	  to	  by	  its	  various	  names,	  but	  recognise	  also	  the	  way	  those	  
names	   are	   combined	   within	   the	   representation.	   “We	   bring	   the	   mode	   of	   combination	   to	  
consciousness	  by	  grasping	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  use	  as	  a	  picture	  and	   its	  structure	  –	   the	  way	   in	  
which	  its	  constituents	  are	  combined	  with	  one	  another.”	  (9)	  
	   As	  Zalabardo	  points	  out,	  such	  a	  ‘grasping	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  use	  as	  a	  picture’	  will	  need	  
to	   be	   a	   species	   of	   awareness	   distinct	   from,	   and	   indeed	   prior	   to,	   the	   propositional	  
representation/understanding	  it	  wants	  to	  explain.	  Zalabardo’s	  exegetical	  proposal	  for	  “this	  
more	   basic	   type	   of	   grasp”	   (9)	   is	   that	   it	   is	   “provided	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	   framework	   by	   the	  
notion	  of	  showing”	  (9).	  I’m	  not	  interested	  to	  criticize	  this	  specific	  suggestion.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  
do,	   rather,	   is	   query	   what	   is	   underlined	   by	   the	   talk	   here	   of	   ‘more	   basic’,	   namely	   that	  
Zalabardo	   sees	   Wittgenstein	   as	   offering	   what	   might	   be	   called	   a	   reductive	   account	   of	  
propositional	   understanding,	   or	   again	   of	   propositional	   representation.	   The	   proposition’s	  
expression	  of	  a	  sense,	  its	  representing	  certain	  objects	  as	  combined	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  is	  to	  be	  
explained	   with	   appeal	   to	   two	   theoretically	   prior	   ideas.	   First	   there	   is	   ‘singling	   out’,	   or	  
reference.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  enough,	  so	  appeal	  is	  made	  also	  to	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  exemplification	  of	  
a	  mode	   of	   combination.	   Or	   as	   regards	   understanding,	   this	   cannot	   be	   explained	   by	   appeal	  
only	   to	   the	   recognition	  of	   relations	  of	   reference,	   but	  must	  draw	  also	  on	   a	   grasping	  of	   the	  
representation’s	  combinatorial	  mode.	  
	   It	   is	  surprising	  given	  the	  drift	  of	  much	  recent	  Tractatus	  scholarship	  that	  Zalabardo	  
doesn’t	   consider	   the	  question	  whether	  Wittgenstein	   is	   interested	   in	  providing	  a	   reductive	  
account	   of	   the	   operation	   (or	   understanding)	   of	   a	   proposition.	   Zalabardo	   discusses	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  context	  with	  Russell,	  but	  there	  has	  been	  an	  emphasis	  in	  the	  literature	  also	  
on	  Wittgenstein’s	  inheritance	  from	  Frege.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  now	  I	  think	  a	  steady	  orthodoxy	  
that	   Wittgenstein’s	   adoption	   of	   Frege’s	   context	   principle	   is	   such	   that	   reference	   is	   not	  
theoretically	  prior	   in	  the	  Tractatus	   to	   the	  expression	  of	  sense.	  Reference	   is	  understood	  by	  
Wittgenstein	  only	  as	  an	  aspect,	  or	  element,	  of	  sense	  expression.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Zalabardo	  
assumes	  without	  hesitation	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  fact’s	  mode	  of	  combination,	  and	  so	  that	  of	  a	  
fact,	   is	   theoretically	   prior	   for	   Wittgenstein	   to	   propositional	   representation,	   and	   so	  
theoretically	  prior	  to	  truth.	  And	  whilst	  this	  assumption	  holds	  good	  of	  course	  for	  Russell,	  it	  is	  
false	  for	  Frege	  and	  will	  be	  false	  on	  a	  more	  Fregean	  reading	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  (see,	  e.g.	  Sullivan	  
2005).	   Personally,	   I	   think	   that	   the	   Russellian	   realism	   of	   fact	   as	   prior	   to	   truth	   is	   never	   in	  
view,	  even,	  for	  the	  Tractarian	  Wittgenstein.	  His	  concerns	  lie	  elsewhere.	  But	  in	  any	  case,	  the	  
smaller	  complaint	   is	   that	   in	  taking	  Wittgenstein	  to	  solve	  rather	  than	  reject	  the	  problem	  of	  
semantic	  unity,	  Zalabardo	  implicitly	  and	  unquestioningly	  rejects	  a	  prevalent	  interpretation	  
under	  which	  the	  “the	  reflection	  that	  singling	  out	  …	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  representing	  things	  as	  
being	   a	   certain	   way”	   (3)	   is	   sorely	   misguided.	   Naming,	   or	   ‘bringing	   an	   object	   to	  
consciousness’,	   is	   not	   some	   already-­‐given	   act	   which	   fails	   to	   be	   enough	   for	   propositional	  
representation.	   Rather,	   naming	   has	   no	   status	   other	   than	   as	   an	   aspect	   of	   propositional	  
representation,	   so	   that	   spelling	   out	   its	   nature	   will	   amount	   to	   nothing	   less	   than	   an	  




Another	   channel	   through	   which	   skepticism	   can	   be	   voiced	   about	   Zalabardo’s	   reductive	  
interpretation	   would	   focus	   on	   his	   central	   proposal	   of	   ‘in	   the	   same	   way’.	   According	   to	  
Zalabardo’s	   Wittgenstein,	   a	   proposition	   presents	   objects,	   and	   it	   has	   its	   mode	   of	  
combination,	   and	   together	   these	   amount	   to	   its	   representing	   that	   the	   objects	   are	   so	  
combined.	   But	   how?	  Why?	  Why	   should	   a	   fact	   whose	   elements	   stand	   for	   various	   objects	  
represent	  that	  those	  objects	  are	  combined	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  its	  elements?	  
	   This	   concern	   could	   be	   read	   as	   a	   request	   for	   elaboration.	   How	   does	   this	   get	   to	  
constitute	  that?	  Or	  it	  could	  be	  read	  as	  a	  request	  for	  justification	  as	  against	  potential	  rivals.	  
Why	   should	   the	   proposal	   of	   an	   identity	   of	   mode	   be	   preferred	   to	   one	   of	   a	   correlation	   of	  
modes?	   Why	   should	   we	   not	   hold	   that	   objects	   introduced	   by	   certain	   names	   at	   certain	  
positions	   in	   a	   mode	   of	   combination	   constitute	   a	   representation	   of	   those	   objects	   as	  
occupying	   distinct	   but	   correlated	   positions	   in	   a	   distinct	   but	   correlated	   mode?	   At	   base,	  
though,	  the	  concern	  is	  not	  that	  Zalabardo’s	  proposal	  on	  Wittgenstein’s	  behalf	  is	  in	  some	  way	  
insufficiently	  explained	  or	  justified,	  but	  a	  sense	  that	  as	  Wittgenstein	  would	  see	  it,	  this	  is	  not	  
somewhere	   to	   be	   making	   ‘proposals’.	   There	   is	   for	   Wittgenstein,	   one	   might	   think,	   no	  
intelligible	   question	   given	   a	   proposition	   of	   how	   it	   represents	   its	   objects	   as	   combined,	   no	  
intelligible	   question	  which	  might	   be	   answered	  by	   an	   ‘in	   the	   same	  way’	   claim.	  Rather,	   the	  
proposition’s	   mode	   of	   combination	   is	   in	   itself	   a	   mode	   of	   a	   proposition	   which	   represents	  
objects	  as	  so	  combined.	  One	  has	  the	  propositional	  mode	  of	  combination	  in	  view,	  and	  so	  the	  
proposition	   in	   view,	   only	   insofar	   as	   one	   has	   in	   view,	   as	   such,	   the	  way	   such	   propositions	  
represent	  objects	   as	   combined.	  Now	   this	   attribution	  will	   of	   course	   itself	  need	  elaboration	  
and	  exegetical	  justification	  –	  something	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  space	  here.	  Evidently,	  though,	  
it	   is	   incompatible	   with	   Zalabardo’s	   reductive	   perspective,	   a	   perspective	   witnessed	   in	  
repeated	   talk	   of	   “facts	   that	   play	   the	   role	   of	   propositions”	   (14,	   17)	   –	   as	   if	   a	   proposition’s	  
status	  as	  a	  proposition	  were	  incidental	  to	  it,	  as	  if	  there	  were	  no	  distinction	  in	  Wittgenstein	  




Let’s	  move	  on	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  metaphysical	  unity.	  This	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  the	  unity	  of	  
facts	  “arises	  from	  the	  manifold	  of	  their	  constituents”	  (12).	  Unlike	  the	  problem	  of	  semantic	  
unity,	  this	  is	  not	  something	  Wittgenstein	  is	  held	  to	  solve.	  Rather,	  he	  rejects	  a	  presupposition	  
of	  its	  arising:	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   Tractatus,	   facts	   in	   general,	   and	   the	   facts	   that	   play	   the	   role	   of	  
propositions	   in	   particular,	   should	   not	   be	   construed	   as	   compounds.	   They	   don't	   arise	  
from	   the	   combination	   of	   constituents.	   They	   are	   ultimate,	   indivisible	   units.	   On	   this	  
account,	  there	  simply	  isn’t	  a	  problem	  of	  how	  the	  unity	  of	  facts	  and	  propositions	  arises	  
from	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   their	   constituents.	  Wittgenstein	  doesn’t	   have	   a	   problem	  with	  
metaphysical	  unity	  not	  because	  he	  has	  found	  a	  way	  of	  saving	  CAF	  [–	  the	  Compositional	  
Account	  of	  Facts	  –]	  from	  the	  difficulty,	  but	  because	  he	  rejects	  CAF.	  (14)	  
	  
Here	  I	  am,	  I	  suspect,	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  Zalabardo’s	  basic	  line.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  
I’m	  unclear	  what	  the	  line	  is,	  because	  I’m	  unclear	  what	  CAF	  amounts	  to.	  And	  certain	  things	  
Zalabardo	  wants	  to	  say	  in	  development	  his	  stance	  strike	  me	  as	  markedly	  unTractarian.	  
	   Rejecting	   CAF,	   Zalabardo	   says	   that	   facts	   are	   “basic	   units”	   “not	   produced	   by	   the	  
combination	  of	  more	  simple	  items”	  (14).	  Names	  are	  not	  “constituent	  parts”	  of	  propositions	  
but	  “features	  that	  propositions	  share	  with	  one	  another”	  (14).	  Ok,	  but	  in	  what	  sense	  of	  ‘basic’	  
or	  ‘simple’?	  In	  what	  sense	  of	  ‘production’?	  In	  what	  sense	  of	  ‘feature’?	  I	  wasn’t	  able	  to	  gather	  
clear	   answers	   to	   these	   questions.	   The	   discussion	   earlier	   in	   the	   paper	   of	   semantic	   unity	  
depended	   for	   its	   sense	   on	   an	   idea	   of	   a	   fact	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   objects,	   of	   objects	   as	  
constituents	   of	   facts,	   of	   a	   fact	   has	   having	   a	   mode	   of	   combination	   etc.	   Following	  
Wittgenstein’s	  lead,	  Zalabardo’s	  discussion	  was	  shot	  through	  with	  such	  talk,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
suggestion	   now	   that	   the	   earlier	   work	   is	   being	   undermined.	   So	   what	   is	   the	   difference	  
between	  a	  fact	  having	  objects	  as	  constituents	  and	  a	  fact	  having	  objects	  as	  constituent	  parts?	  
What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  facts	  being	  combinations	  of	  objects	  and	  facts	  being	  produced	  
by	  the	  combination	  of	  objects?	  	  
At	  times,	  Zalabardo	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  what	  he	  wants	  to	  oppose	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
temporal	   process	   of	   objects	   combining.	   So	   he	   insists	   that	   “no	   combination	   needs	   to	   take	  
place”	  (16):	  
	  
The	   unity	   of	   a	   proposition	   is	   non-­‐derivative,	   fundamental.	   It	   doesn’t	   arise	   from	   a	  
process	  of	  composition.	  (16)	  
	  
But	   of	   course	   a	   Tractarian	   fact	   is	   not	   the	   result	   of	   a	   temporal	   process	   of	   composition,	  
something	   that	   takes	  place,	   any	  more	   indeed	   than	   a	  Russellian	   fact	   is	   the	   result	   of	   such	   a	  
process!	  Opposing	  that	  is	  hardly	  a	  substantive	  position.	  Presumably,	  then,	  Zalabardo’s	  talk	  
of	   ‘process’	   and	   ‘taking	   place’	   is	   a	   metaphor:	   but	   what	   for?	   On	   ‘features’	   versus	  
‘compounding’,	  Zalabardo	  writes:	  
	  
	  Just	   as	   people	   share	   heights,	   incomes,	   hobbies	   and	   character	   traits	   without	   being	  
compounded	   from	   these	   items,	   propositions	   [and	   facts	   more	   generally]	   share	  
characteristic	  marks	  without	  being	  compounded	  from	  them.	  (14)	  
	  
But	  this	  comparison	  isn’t	  helpful	  either.	  An	  atomic	  fact	  is	  set	  forth,	  and	  completely	  so,	  by	  the	  
elementary	   proposition	   which	   expresses	   it.	   And	   within	   such	   an	   expression	   there	   is	  
reference	  to,	  and	  only	  to,	  its	  constituent	  objects.	  Quite	  unlike	  the	  matter	  of	  people’s	  heights	  
and	   incomes,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   there	   is	  no	   fact	  beyond	   its	   ‘features’	   or	   ‘characteristic	  marks’,	  
nothing	   to	   which	   those	   ‘features’	   attach.	   A	   fact	   has	   no	   content,	   or	   indeed	   particularity,	  
beyond	   that	   of	   its	   objects.	   So	   Zalabardo’s	   “Just	   as”	   here	   must	   read	   as	   a	   “Somewhat	  
similarly”.	  But	  what	  is	  the	  similarity	  to	  be?	  
	   To	   be	   clear,	   I’m	   not	   suggesting	   that	   the	   sentence	   “A	   fact	   is	   not	   produced	   out	   of	  
objects”	   can	   in	  no	  way	  be	  habilitated,	   that	  Wittgenstein’s	  position	   cannot	  be	  described	  as	  
one	  on	  which	   facts	   are	  basic.	  On	   the	   contrary,	  Wittgenstein’s	   straightforward	   stance	  here	  
might	  indeed,	  at	  a	  slight	  stretch,	  be	  described	  in	  such	  ways.	  As	  Wittgenstein	  conceives	  them,	  
objects	   are	   precisely	   possible	   parts	   of	   facts.	   Objects	   are	   not	   items	   which	   have	   a	   reality	  
independent	   of	   their	   possibilities	   for	   figuring	   in	   facts,	   so	   that	   we	   can	   ask:	   how	   do	   these	  
things,	   being	  what	   they	   are,	   get	   to	   figure	   in	   facts	   in	   the	  ways	   they	   do?	   Again,	   an	   object’s	  
basic	   nature	   Wittgenstein	   calls	   its	   form,	   and	   the	   object’s	   form	   is	   not	   something	   which	  
grounds	  its	  possibilities	  for	  appearing	  in	  facts:	  it	  is	  those	  possibilities	  (TLP	  2.0141).	  
Zalabardo	  appears	  however	  to	  be	  thinking	   in	  a	  more	   ‘ontological’	  manner	  with	  his	  
notion	   of	   ‘basic’,	   or	   ‘fundamental’.	   So	   for	   example	   he	   asks	   whether	   “in	   treating	   facts	   as	  
fundamental,	  Wittgenstein	  is	  ascribing	  this	  status	  to	  all	  states	  of	  affairs,	  obtaining	  and	  non-­‐
obtaining	   alike”	   (18).	   And	   the	   emphatic	   answer	   here	   is	   ‘no’.	   A	   reading	   on	   which	   non-­‐
obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  fundamental:	  
	  
would	   be	   a	   serious	   distortion	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   view.	   It	   would	   amount,	   in	   effect,	   to	  
ascribing	   to	  Wittgenstein	  an	  ontology	  of	  Russellian	  propositions,	  as	   they	   figure	   in	   the	  
dual-­‐relation	  theory	  …	  .	  Wittgenstein’s	  thought	  that	  what	  is	  the	  case	  is	  fundamental	  …	  is	  
the	  claim	  that	  obtaining	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  fundamental.	  (18)	  
	  
Now	  there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  good	  question	  how,	  if	  objects	  are	  non-­‐fundamental	  features	  
shared	  between	   fundamental	  states	  of	  affairs,	  and	   if	   fundamentality	  belongs	  only	   to	   those	  
states	   of	   affairs	   that	   obtain,	   objects	   could	   constitute	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   world	   which	  
subsists	  independently	  of	  what	  is	  the	  case	  (TLP	  2.021,	  2.024).	  But	  the	  wider	  concern	  here	  is	  
that	   I	   have	   little	   idea	  what	   Zalabardo	  might	  mean	   by	   ‘fundamental’,	   or	   indeed	   ‘ontology’.	  
Unlike	  the	  Russellian	  propositions	  of	  the	  early,	  dual-­‐relation	  theory,	  Tractarian	  facts	  are	  not	  
‘portions	  of	  reality’	  which	  either	  exist	  or	  fail	  to	  exist.	  So	  what	  is	  a	  claim	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  Jack	  
loves	  Jill	   is	  fundamental	  to	  mean	  other	  than,	  perhaps,	  that	  this	  is	  an	  atomic	  fact	  (a	  state	  of	  
affairs)?	  And	  what	  is	  a	  claim	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  Jack	  loves	  Jill	  is	  ‘in	  Wittgenstein’s	  ontology’	  to	  




No	  doubt	  Zalabardo’s	  thinking	  here	  connects	  to	  what	  I	  identified	  above	  as	  a	  realism	  of	  fact	  
as	   prior	   to	   truth.	   And	   no	   doubt	   my	   bafflement	   connects	   to	   my	   understanding	   of	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  which	  such	  a	  view	  isn’t	  so	  much	  as	  on	  his	  radar.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  divergence	  
is	   I	   think	   far-­‐reaching.	   The	   idea	   that	   Wittgenstein,	   like	   Russell,	   proposes	   a	   basic	  
metaphysical	   framework	  given	  quite	   independently	  of	   thought,	  with	  his	  picture	   theory	  an	  
account	   within	   that	   framework	   of	   a	   certain	   contingent	   (but	   for	   some	   reason	   very	  
interesting)	   ‘worldly	  phenomenon’,	  namely	  representation,	   is	   I	   think	  liable	  to	  block	  access	  
to	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  insights	  of	  his	  work.	  
	   As	   a	   final	   comment,	   I’d	   like	   to	   raise	   a	   question	   of	   the	   compatibility	   between	   the	  
reactions	   of	   Zalabardo’s	   Wittgenstein	   to	   the	   semantic	   and	   metaphysical	   problems.	  
Zalabardo	   introduces	   the	   semantic	  problem	  as	   something	  which	   “arises	   for	   a	   strategy	   for	  
explaining	   our	   faculty	   of	   propositional	   representation	   that	   exploits	   the	   resources	   of	   the	  
CAF”	   (3).	   And	   he	   is	   explicit	  when	   discussing	   the	  metaphysical	   problem	   that	  Wittgenstein	  
“rejects	   CAF”	   (14).	   So	   how	   is	   it	   that	   Wittgenstein	   presents	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   semantic	  
problem	  (see,	  e.g.,	  11),	  as	  opposed	  to	  offering	  a	  view	  for	  which	  that	  problem	  doesn’t	  arise?	  
Zalabardo’s	  own	  characterizations	  to	  one	  side,	  the	  tension	  here	  seems	  clear.	  If	  the	  semantic	  
problem	   is	   to	   arise	   of	  what	  more	   is	   needed	   for	   representation	  besides	   the	   singling	   out	   of	  
objects,	  then	  the	  act	  of	  singling	  out	  an	  object	  must	  have	  a	  status	  other	  than	  as	  an	  element	  of	  
fact	  representation.	  But	  if	  singling	  out	  an	  object	  is	  something	  other	  than	  an	  element	  of	  fact	  
representation,	   how	   nonetheless	   do	   objects	   have	   no	   status	   other	   than	   as	   elements	   (or	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